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ERODING THE BLUE WALL OF SILENCE: THE
NEED FOR AN INTERNAL AFFAIRS PRIVILEGE
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
"I think it's obvious this matter would have been much easier
to deal with if everyone had told the truth to begin with."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quote by Boston Police Commissioner Paul Evans reflects the Department's frustration with its investigation into the beating
of Officer Michael Cox, a recent police misconduct case in Massachusetts. 2 Highly publicized incidents such as the Michael Cox beating, the
shooting of Amadou Diallo in New York, the attack on Rodney King by
a group of Los Angeles police officers, as well as other cases of corruption, racism, and abuses have fed the public's dissatisfaction with the
management of police power in the United States.3 Reflecting this shift
in public opiiion, civil rights groups, and espec;ally the press, have
'Brian MacQuarrie, Two Found Liable in Beating of Fellow Officer, A Third Policeman Also Implicated; Another Cleared,BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 22240828.
2 See id. Cox, a black plainclothes member of the Boston Police Gang Unit, was
reportedly beaten by a group of fellow officers who mistook him for a shooting suspect.
Id. Nearly four years passed before the Boston Police disciplined any of the suspect
officers. Id. Commissioner Evans cited the refusal of police officers brought before the
Department's Internal Affairs Division as a major obstacle in the investigation. Id.
During this period, Officer Cox filed suit against Evans and the Boston Police Department accusing them of a pattern of deliberate indifference toward police misconduct.
Shelly Murphy and Ric Kahn, FourAre Disciplinedin Beating of Officer, BOSTON
GLOBE, at AI, Oct. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9160978. Cox ultimately settled
with the City of Boston for $900,000.00. Ralph Ranalli, Cop Shelves Cash Bid in Beating Suit v. Officers, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 18, 1999, available in 1999 WL 3390856.
3See Tracy Tully and Alice McQuillan, Congress Probe of NYPD Brutality Urged,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2, 1999, at 24, available in 1999 WL 3426621 (describing calls
for legislative reform in response to shooting of unarmed suspect by police officers);
Jamison S. Prime, Note, A Double-BarreledAssault: How Technology and Judicial
InterpretationsThreaten Public Access to Law Enforcement Records, 48 FED. COMM.
L.J. 341, 350 (1996) (reviewing incidents of police misconduct and their effects on public perception in different municipalities).
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called for closer monitoring and scrutiny of police departments and their
officers.4 In Massachusetts, a trend has developed during the past thirty
years toward more public disclosure of police documents in an effort to
restrict the abuse of power by police officers. 5 While this may be seen as
a route to increase police accountability, has the public disclosure of police files in Massachusetts gone so far as to act against the interests of
the public by hampering internal police investigations?
This article advocates a specific statutory privilege of confidentiality for the contents of police department internal affairs files. 6 It will
examine the inherent difficulties for police departments in conducting an
internal investigation into an officer's conduct (the Code of Silence).7
The note will show how a statutory guarantee of confidentiality would
serve the interests of the public.8 Such a statutory guarantee would not
make internal police files completely inaccessible to public scrutiny but
rather would raise the standard for disclosure. 9 By offering confidentiality to witnesses in an internal investigation, Massachusetts police departments may begin to chip away at the Code of Silence among their
own officers.

II. MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC RECORDS LAW
The 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has become the
model for the public's access to government records through its presumption of disclosure.10 The FOIA mandates that government agencies
Prime, supra note 3, at 348-49 (outlining calls for increased police scrutiny).
See also Gabriel J. Chin and Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of
Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233,
251 (1998) (explaining pressures placed on police by general public and media for openness).
4See

'See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text (tracing trend toward disclosure).
6 See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (explaining conflict between disclosure and police investigations).
7 See infra notes 44-55 and accompanying text (outlining dynamics of Code of Silence).
. See infra notes 77-106 and accompanying text (stating how statutory exemptions
in other states serve public interest).
9See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text (defining disclosure standard).

'0See Freedom of Information Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat.
250 (codified as 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1999)). The congressional intent of the FOIA was to
"open agency action to the light of public scrutiny." Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
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shall make available for public inspection and copying any opinions,
orders, policy statements, staff instructions and manuals, and generally
any other documents requested by the public." This presumption of disclosure of government materials is limited by a set of statutory exemptions, many of which speak specifically to the records of law enforcement agencies.' 2 While the federal statute allows for specific exemptions
from disclosure for confidential law enforcement sources, such3 statutory
language is absent from the Massachusetts public records law.'
The Massachusetts public records statute follows the FOIA in its
presumption of public records disclosure.14 In the Commonwealth,
"public records" are defined to mean:

" See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (1999) (creating liberal disclosure policy of government
documents).
12 See id. Section 552 provides in pertinent part as follows:

Id.

This section does not apply to records that are records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would
deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the Identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or
authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to
risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.

Compare 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1999) (revealing increased confidentiality afforded federal law enforcement) with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (West
1999) (reflecting less specific exemptions to disclosure).
14 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10a (West 1999). The statute states in perti13

nent part as follows:
Every person having custody of any public record... shall, at reasonable times and without unreasonable delay, permit it, or any divisible portion of a record which is an independent public record, to
be inspected and examined by any person, under his supervision, and
shall furnish one copy thereof upon payment of a reasonable fee.
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all books, papers, maps, photographs, recorded tapes, financial statements, statistical tabulations or other documentary materials or data, regardless of physical form or
characteristics, made or received by any officer or employee of any agency, executive office, department,
board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the
commonwealth ... or of any authority established by the
general court to serve a public purpose.1 5
This current definition of public records, introduced in 1973,
greatly expanded the previous definition of what constituted a public
document.' 6 By expanding the definition of what constitutes a public
record, numerous government documents that
had previously been
17
privileged were now open to public inspection.
Following the FOIA public records model, Massachusetts limits
its presumption of public records disclosure with a number of exemptions.' 8 Unlike its federal counterpart, however, the exemptions allowed
'6 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (West 1999). See infra note 30 (describing investigatory exemption of cl. 26(f)).
'6 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 4, § 7, cl. 26 (West 1999) (defining public

document in Massachusetts). The previous statutory definition limited public records to
printed materials that are the property of the Commonwealth or have been received by a
public employee "in or on which any entry has been made or is required to be made by
law." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (West 1972). This language had been
construed to represent what came to be known as the "legal requirement test" for public
records. See Commonwealth v. Holt, 1995 WL 670141, at *1 (Mass. Super. Oct. 17,
1995) (emphasizing invalidation of legal requirement for public records from change in
statutory construction); Hastings & Sons Publ'g Cc. v. Treasurer of Lynn, 374 Mass.
812, 815-16, 375 N.E.2d 299, 302 (1978) (stating post-1973 statutory construction
eliminated legal requirement); Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 417, 421,
319 N.E.2d 423, 426 n.3 (1974) (discussing expanded definition of public records).
Compare Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 65-66, 354 N.E.2d 872,
877 (1976) (explaining post-1973 statutory construction) with Town Crier, Inc. v. Chief
of Police of Weston, 361 Mass. 682, 685, 282 N.E.2d 379, 381 (1972) (stating pre-1973
statutory construction).
7 See Holt, 1995 WL 670141, at *1 (invalidating legal requirement due to statutory change).
'a See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (West 1999) (offering twelve exemptions to disclosure mandated in MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10). The exemptions
include privileges for public records (a) exempted from disclosure by statute, (b) related
solely to internal personnel rules and practices of the governmental unit, (c) personnel
and medical files the disclosure of which may constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, (d) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy
positions being developed by the agency, (e) notebooks and other materials prepared by
a state employee not maintained as a file of the agency, (f) investigatory materials compiled by law enforcement or other officials the disclosure of which would probably so
prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that disclosure would not be in the
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in the Massachusetts statute are less specific and more ambiguously
worded. 19 This dearth of specificity has left the constructions of these
exemptions to the state's judiciary who have increasingly minimized their
meaning over the past two decades. 20

III. THE TREND TOWARD DISCLOSURE OF POLICE FILES
We may trace the trend toward disclosure of police files away
from a police privilege toward nearly complete disclosure by examining
case law beginning in the 1960's through the present. In United States v.
Mackey,2 ' the district court for the District of Columbia held that it could
not compel a police department to produce documents pertaining to its
internal operations. 22 The court constructed its decision around a separation of powers argument by reasoning the Metropolitan Police Department was an Executive agency.23 The court went on to state that law
enforcement records should be regarded as confidential and not subject
to public disclosure. 24
While Mackey concerned the disclosure of police files in the
context of a criminal trial, the court in Kott v. Perini25 expanded the

public interest, (g) trade secrets, commercial or financial information voluntarily provided to an agency for policy development under a promise of confidentiality, (h) sealed
proposals and bids, (i) appraisals of real property acquired or to be acquired until such
real property is no longer controverted by litigation, (j) personal information within
firearm permits, (k) deleted, (1) testing materials, (in) health care service contracts between a government facility and a health maintenance organization. Id.
" Compare 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (b) (West 1999) (carving out specific exemptions)
with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7, cl. 26 (West 1999) (providing more ambiguous
exemptions than federal statute).
2
See James G. Gilbert, Free Liberty to Search and View: A Look at Public Access to CriminalOffender Record Information in the Commonwealth, 41 Dec. B.B.J. 12,
12-13 (1997) (discussing minimization of statutory privacy protections for criminal offender record data).
21 36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C., Jan. 15, 1965).
See id. at 433 (stating law enforcement agency records are confidential).
23
See id. (reasoning separation of government powers precludes court supervision
of Executive Branch).
214 See id. (citing public interest in effective law enforcement precludes disclo-

sure).
2

283 F. Supp. 1 (ND. Ohio 1968).

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. V

privilege for police files to civil cases as well.26 Here the court did not
follow the Mackey separation of powers argument, but rather based its
opinion on the public policy grounds of allowing police officers to execute their duties effectively. 27 The court predicated its decision on the
"certain and chilling effect upon such record making" if there existed the
possibility that confidential recorded information could be later exposed
to outside parties. 28
In Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington,29 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts read the investigatory exemption of the state
public records law as covering reports prepared by police officers in
connection with a criminal investigation. 30 The court echoed the sentiment of the Mackey decision in reasoning the disclosure of law enforcement investigatory materials would work against the public interest by
detracting from effective law enforcement.3 1 The Bougas court extended
See id. at 2 (stating public policy reasons against disclosure apply to civil and
criminal situations).
27

See id. (describing need for confidentiality of police records).

28 Id.

371 Mass. 59, 354 N.E.2d 872 (1976).
See id. at 62 (recognizing disclosure of investigatory materials could detract
from effective law enforcement). The requested reports included police observations,
witness statements, and other confidential information that the court believed would have
compromised police effectiveness. Id. The court emphasized that this exemption was
not a "blanket exemption," nor did it extend to every document connected with an investigation. Id. at 65. The court stated the police department must show that the requested
documents fall within the provided exemption. Id. at 65-66. The investigatory exemption states in pertinent part: "investigatory materials necessarily compiled out of the
public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials the disclosure of which
materials would probably so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that
such disclosure would not be in the public interest" are to be exempted from the disclosure mandated by MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 4, § 7, cl.
26(f) (West 1999).
31
See Bougas, 371 Mass. at 61-62 (returning to Mackay-style public policy arguments favoring non-disclosure). The policy considerations underlying the exemption of
law enforcement materials outlined by the Bougas court set the standard for later public
records cases involving police records. Id. These considerations include:
30

the avoidance of premature disclosure of the Commonwealth's case
prior to trial, the prevention of the disclosure of confidential investigative techniques, procedures, or sources of information, the encouragement of individual citizens to come forward and speak freely with
police concerning matters under investigation, and the creation of
initiative that police officers might be completely candid in recording
their observations, hypotheses, and interim conclusions.
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this investigatory exclusion to correspondence between the public and
the police.32
An investigation of a number of recent public records cases in
Massachusetts concerning police materials reveals how sharply the
courts have diverged from their earlier approach.3 3 In Doe v. Lyons,34 the
court effectively narrowed the definition of "investigatory materials" by
allowing police reports, witness statements, and witness identities to be
disclosed in a civil lawsuit arising from a sexual assault.35 In Lyons, the
court held that the Boston Police Department had not specifically shown
the release of the requested documents would have a prejudicial effect on
future law enforcement. 36 The court also stated that the release of witness statements and the identities of witnesses would not deter witnesses
to future crimes from coming forward.3 7 Lyons demonstrated that the
burden to be met by police in order to fall under the investigatory exemption had shifted in the years since Bougas, and subsequent police
disclosure cases in Massachusetts have reinforced this approach to disclosure.38

In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Evans,39 the court held that copies of
Seized Money Forms filed by the Boston Police Department's Drug
Control Division were not exempt from Massachusetts public records
law.4 The judiciary distinguished Evans from Bougas by reasoning that
the routine nature by which the requested forms were compiled excluded

Id. In determining whether a specific document falls within a public records exemption,
the court opined that an in camera inspection may be appropriate. Id. at 66.
32 See Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (including reports from private citizens under definition of investigatory material); Bougas,
371 Mass. at 63 (stating disclosure of informant letters would interfere with law enforcement investigations); see also Reinstein v. Police Comm'r, 378 Mass. 281, 290, 391
N.E.2d 881, 886 (1979) (stating investigative exemption designed to protect confidential
sources and secret investigative procedures).
'3

See infra notes 34-43 (describing movement away from earlier judicial posi-

,4

No. CIV. A. 96-0341, 1996 WL 751531, at *6-8 (Mass. Super. Dec. 23, 1996).

as

Id.

tions).

See id. (demonstrating burden of proof for disclosure shifting from public to

police).
37

See id. (rejecting arguments that disclosure would "chill" future investiga-

tions).
. See infra notes 39-43 (illustrating Massachusetts trend toward disclosure).
No. CIV. A. 97-4102-E, 1997 WL 448182 (Mass. Super. Aug. 5, 1997).
See id. at *5 (stating public interest not served by preventing disclosure).
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them from the class of investigative materials gathered in connection
with a specific incident. 4' The court continued by stating that the Boston
Police had not met its burden of showing that the disclosure of these
forms would hamper future investigations or the ongoing internal investigation of misconduct in connection with the seizures.42 As the judiciary
moves toward more complete disclosure of police materials, this issue of
officer truthfulness becomes central within the context of an internal
investigation.4 3

IV. POLICE PERJURY AND INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
As described in the Introduction of this article, many members of
the public feel that police misuse of power is on the rise. 44 Different
interest groups, and especially the press, view public disclosure laws as a
check against this misuse of police power.4 5 A number of municipalities
have begun to employ civilian review boards in order to address police
misconduct complaints. 46 Like the press' call for liberal disclosure laws,
41

See id. at *3 (separating routinely compiled materials from definition of inves-

tigatory materials). Despite the fact that these seized money forms were prepared in
connection with actual drug arrests and seizures, the court felt that their "ministerial"
nature invalidated their investigatory quality. Id. at *3.
42 See id. at *3-4 (illustrating court's dissatisfaction with police arguments). The
court rejected the theory that the disclosure of these materials would discourage private
citizens from coming forward to offer information pertaining to the misconduct investigation or compel police officers to be less than "completely candid" in their participation. Id. But see infra note 86 (stating negative impact of disclosure on police investigations).
43

See infra notes 44-50 (describing issues of perjury in internal investigations).

" See Prime, supra note 3 at 349-55 (describing Americans' growing perception
of police misconduct); Davis S. Cohen, Note, Official Oppression: A HistoricalAnalysis
of Low - Level Abuse and a Modem Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
165, 170 (1996) (discussing dissipating trust and respect for police in urban areas);
Leanora Minai, Mistrust May HinderDetectives, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 31, 1998,
at 1, available in 1998 WL 4277935 (describing Justice Department study finding widespread mistrust of police by African-Americans in St. Petersburg, Florida); Chuck Lindell and Tara Trower, Bridging a Chasm of Mistrust: Police Working to Mend Minorities' Frayed Confidence, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 5, 1998, at 1, available in
1998 WL 3598956 (profiling efforts by Austin, Texas police to regain trust of AfricanAmerican communities).
See Prime, supra note 3 at 345-49 (explaining need for public records laws with
strong disclosure authority).

See id. at 348 (describing limited usage of civilian review boards); Sean
Hecker, Note, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civilian Review
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the use of these external boards has arisen out of a failure of police departments to deal with civilian complaints effectively.47 Possibly the
most difficult obstacle to overcome in a police internal affairs investiga48
tion is what has come to be known as the "Blue Wall of Silence."
The terms "Blue Wall of Silence" and "Code of Silence" describe
the well documented unwritten code among police officers which prohibits them from disclosing misconduct or perjury by fellow officers. 49
This Code of Silence has been called the "greatest single barrier to the
effective investigation and adjudication of complaints" against police
officers and is enforced by the threat of ostracism, harassment, and even
life-endangering retaliation by fellow officers. 50 Recently in Massachusetts, media attention has focused on the plight of Boston Police Officer
Michael Cox who was reportedly beaten by four fellow officers who
mistook him for a shooting suspect. 5' Sparked by the Boston Police Department's inability to address the incident internally, the Boston Globe

Board, 28 CoLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 551, 593-94 (1997) (reviewing use of civilian
review boards in different municipalities); Richard S. Jones, Processing Civilian Complaints: A Study of the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 505,
506 (1994) (tracing creation of civilian oversight boards); Ken Takahashi, The ReleaseDismissalAgreement: An Imperfect Instrument of Dispute Resolution, 72 WASH. U.L.Q.
1769, 1799 (1994) (describing advantages of independent civilian boards in responding
to citizen complaints). But see Maureen Fan, Suits v. Cops Seen Costing City Millions,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998 available in 1998 WL 21934551 (contending New
York City's civilian reviewed board proven ineffective).
'7See Hecker, supra note 46 at 593-94 (describing perception that internal police
mechanisms fail to discipline abuses of police power); Jones, supra note 46 at 507
(pointing to formation of civilian boards arising out of failure of police to regulate themselves.); Takahashi, supra note 46 at 1799 (arguing civilian boards are more effective
than police internal affairs departments).
48 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (defining "Blue Wall of Silence").
'9 See Chin and Wells, supra note 3 at 237-40 (describing prevalence of Code of
Silence within police departments).
soSee id. at 240-41 and 254 (characterizing types of negative reinforcement that
prevent police from implicating fellow officers). The torturing of Abner Louima by
police officers of New York's 70th precinct precipitated an internal investigation involving the questioning of some 100 officers. Id. at 241-44. When two officers broke
their silence to offer information, the city placed the two officers and their families under
armed protection fearing retaliation by fellow officers. Id. Boston Police Officer Michael Cox reportedly received harassing telephone calls and suffered the vandalizing of
his car after bringing suit against the Boston Police Department for failing to discipline
the police officers who had beaten him. Shelly Murphy, Beaten Officer's Lawsuit Merits
Trial,Judge Finds,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22236196.
5'See supra note 2 (describing circumstances surrounding beating of Officer Michael Cox).
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conducted an investigation of the Department and concluded that serious
problems of excessive force were compounded by a Code of Silence
among Boston police officers.5 2 Boston Chief of Police Paul Evans
blamed the ineffectiveness of the Department's four year internal affairs
investigation on the refusal of officers to cooperate.53 The fact that three
of the officers implicated in the Cox beating had nine prior misconduct
complaints filed against them has led to accusations of "deliberate indifference" by the Boston Police toward the misconduct of its officers. 54 If
the Code of Silence among officers is reinforced by fears of reprisal, 55
then the Massachusetts judiciary's trend toward the disclosure of internal
police materials is acting to reinforce this "Blue Wall" by making public
record of the names of internal investigation participants.

V. JUDICIAL DISCLOSURE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS MATERIALS
The disclosure of internal affairs materials in Massachusetts has
its foundation in the judicial treatment of confidential informants.5 The
57
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Johnson
addressed the question of whether to disclose the name of a confidential
witness in a murder trial.58 There the court employed a balancing test to
weigh the interests of the defense with those of the confidential witness
in order to determine whether disclosure of the witness' identity was justified. 59 The court held for the, disclosure of the witness' identity.6°
Within its decision to disclose the witness' identity, the court narrowed
52

See id. (pointing to Cox scandal as evidence of continuing code of silence

among officers).
6 See supra note I and accompanying text (quoting Police Chief Evans).
See Shelley Murphy, Complaints Follow Officer Accused in Cox Beating,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22235065 (describing accusations
of negligence against Boston Police Department).
6 See Chin and Wells, supra note 3 (characterizing how fear of reprisal within
police departments contributes to code of silence among police officers).
See infra notes 57-69 (outlining judicial treatment of confidential witness
statements).
67 365 Mass. 534, 313 N.E.2d
571 (1974).
" Id. at 543.
9 See id. at 545 (illustrating balancing test). See also Roviaro v. United States,
353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (defining parameters of balancing witness Identity against
defendant's interests).
6o See Johnson, 365 Mass. at 546 (holding for disclosure).

20001

LAW ENFORCEMENT PUBLIC RECORDS EXCEPTION

29

the scope of informant privilege by stating that no specific showing of
prejudice by the defense was necessary. 6' This relaxed standard for
overcoming the informant privilege would later open the gates for the
generous disclosure of police internal affairs files.
In 1992, a Boston newspaper brought suit to compel the production of internal affairs files pertaining to the Boston Police Department's
investigation of allegations of police misconduct during the murder investigation of Carol Stuart. 62 In response to the complaint, the Department claimed the requested materials were exempt from the public records statute under statutory, privacy, and investigatory exemptions.63
Among other arguments in support of its defense, the Department argued
that disclosure of officer statements in any Internal Affairs Department
(IAD) investigation would have a "chilling effect" on future law enforcement endeavors. 64 In weighing the arguments of both parties, the
court reviewed the requested materials in camera. 65 In light of its review,
the court held in favor of redacting the names, addresses, and other information pertaining to citizen witnesses in the interests of protecting
personal privacy. 66 The court did not, however, extend the same privilege to the names and statements of police witnesses within the lAD investigation. 67 In doing this, the court reasoned that the statements of the
police officers contained neither personal information nor information

0"

See id. at 547 (striking prejudice requirement for disclosure). Later cases

would build on Johnson to more clearly define the burden to be met by the defense. See
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 421 Mass. 272, 276, 656 N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (1995) (consolidating standards set fourth in Johnson and Lugo); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406
Mass. 565, 574, 548 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (1990) (defining defendant burden as preliminary showing disclosure would provide material evidence).
'2
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Bratton, No. 9275171, 1993 WL 818904, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Sept. 7, 1993). The BPD's own internal investigation was a response to the
United States' Department of Justice's investigation of allegations of police misconduct
in the investigation of suspect Willie Bennett. id. at *1.

' See Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62 (1976) (explaining investigatory exemption); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 7 cl. 26(a) (West 1999)
(defining statutory exemption); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 4, § 7 cl. 26(c) (West 1999)
(defining privacy exemption).
64 See Bratton 1993 WL 818904, at *4 (referencing testimony of Boston Police
detective).
" See id. at *5 (following Bougas). See also Bougas, 371 Mass. at 61-62 (1976)
(explaining use of in camera inspection).
" See Bratton, 1993 WL 818904, at *6 (balancing public law enforcement interests with personal privacy interests).
'7 See id. at *7 (declining to make police witness statements privileged).
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Here the
whose disclosure would impede effective law enforcement.
court specifically rejected the notion that this sort of disclosure would
denied the
deter internal police investigations, and in doing so, indirectly
69
existence of a Code of Silence among police officers.
The Massachusetts judiciary applied this same attitude toward
disclosure to a criminal defendant's request for an arresting officer's internal police department records in Commonwealth v. WaniS. 70 In Wanis,
the party moving to compel disclosure did not argue that the requested
documents were public records, so the court did not consider the applicability of statutory exemptions to the Massachusetts public records law.7,
Following the line of previous cases, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that no special showing of relevance or need is necessary
to compel a subpoena for the production of percipient witness statements
found within an IAD investigation. 72 For other information found within
an internal affairs investigation, the court stated in dicta that the defense
must show a specific, good faith reason for believing that the information
is relevant to a material issue in the proceedings and could be
beneficial.73 The court felt confident in its decision that its standard for
disclosing IAD information would "reassure" those who provide witness
statements. 74 This decision and its attitude toward the confidentiality of
internal affairs files grossly underestimates the force of the Code of Silence among police officers and the difficulties inherent in carrying out

6

See id.(rejecting privacy and public interest arguments against disclosure).
See id. (stating possible prejudice to law enforcement would not outweigh pub-

lic interest in disclosure). By not extending the investigatory privilege of M.G.L.A. ch.
4, § 7, cl. 26(f) to internal affairs files, the court assumed that the disclosure of an officer's name and statement who participated in an internal affairs investigation would not
"impede effective law enforcement." Id. at *7.
70 426 Mass. 639, 690 N.E.2d 407 (1998).
71 Id. at 642-43.
7
See id. at 644 (following previous case law); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 421
Mass. 272, 276, 656 N.E.2d 1237, 1239 (1995) (defining burden of production). The
court held that under a defendant's motion pursuant to MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17, a judge
should normally issue a subpoena to the internal affairs division to produce the statements of percipient witnesses. Wanis, 426 Mass. at 644.

See Wanis, 426 Mass. at 644-45 (describing disclosure standard). The court
went on to state that personal information about a police officer, his or her previous
conduct, and the conclusions of internal affairs investigators should only be disclosed
upon meeting this standard. Id. at 645. This standard does nothing to chip away at the
police code of silence, though, as an extremely low standard needs to be met in order to
disclose the names and statements of officers who volunteer information in an internal
investigation.
7 id.
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an internal affairs investigation.75 One possible solution to this situation
would be to extend a statutory privilege similar to those found in the
federal public records statute in order to raise the standard to be met before a court could disclose IAD files.76

VI. A MASSACHUSETTS STATUTORY LAW ENFORCEMENT
PRIVILEGE
While the Massachusetts legislature and judiciary have promoted
the disclosure of public records in recent decades, the federal government has expanded the privilege for confidential sources of law enforcement agencies." In order to qualify for the exemption under the federal
statute, the information must have been provided under an express or
implied condition of confidentiality. 78 An implied confidentiality is determined by weighing the nature of the crime involved, the relation of the
source to the crime, and the risks of retaliation, harassment, or reprisal to
the informant should his or her identity be disclosed.7 9 While the federal
statute acts as a blanket exemption once this test has been met, some

75 See infra note 86 (stating effects of disclosure on police investigations).
76

See infra note 77 (providing overview of federal public records disclosure stan-

dard).
, See Wolfe v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 417,421, 319 N.E.2d 423,
426 n.3 (1974) (explaining how 1973 amendment to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.4, § 7,
cl. 26 broadened scope of what constitutes public record); supra notes 34-43 and 52-72
(tracking judicial trend toward disclosure). Compare 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(D) (West
1985) (offering more limited confidential privilege) with 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(D)
(West 1998) (expanding exemption to include states, local, foreign, or private agencies
offering information on confidential basis). The 1986 amendment to the statute lightened the burden of proof on the government from showing that disclosure would reveal
the identity of a confidential source to showing that disclosure "could reasonable be
expected to disclose" informant identity. Providence Journal Co. v. United States Dept.
of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 564 (1st Cir. 1992). See also Irons v. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 811 F.2d 681, 687 (1 st Cir. 1987) (explaining congressional intention of
amendment).
78 See United States Dept. of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 172 (1993) (stating that circumstances under which information is provided rather than type of information is controls); Ortiz v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 70 F.3d
729, 733-34 (2nd Cir. 1995) (defining understanding of confidentiality requirement).
71 See Ortiz, 70 F.3d at 733-34 (listing factors considered to determine implied
confidentiality). Courts will employ in camera review to weigh these factors. Id.
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individual states have extended more limited exemptions for the treatment of police department internal affairs files.80
California's statutory police privilege, found in the state's penal
code, creates a presumption of confidentiality for internal affairs files.8'
This presumption may be overcome by a litigant who can show that the
information sought is relevant to the lawsuit in question.8 2 Courts employ in camera inspection to balance the defendant's needs with the privacy interests of the police officer in question. 3 Even when the defendant has met his or her burden for disclosure, courts have interpreted the
"good cause" requirement found in the evidence code exception to limit
disclosure to only minimal information."
The State of New York extends a privilege to police internal affairs files somewhat similar to that of California. 5 The New York

See ProvidenceJournal,981 F.2d at 566 (illustrating limited exemptions in
Rhode Island). Whether or not disclosure would identify a confidential source is irrelevant so long as the information is provided under a condition of confidentiality. Id.
8a CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7(a) (West 1999). The California code provides in
pertinent part: "Peace officer personnel records maintained by any state or local agency
pursuant to Section 832.5, or information obtained from these records, are confidential
and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code." Id.
See City of Hemet v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1411, 1425, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 532, 541 (1995) (illustrating relevancy burden).
'3 See City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 81 (1989) (describing
balancing test to compel disclosure).
" See Kelvin L. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 823, 828-29 (1976) (interpreting "good cause" requirement in California statute). CAL. EviD. CODE § 1043(b)(3)
(West 1999). The California Evidence Code states in pertinent part: "Affidavits showing
good cause for the disclosure or the discovery sought, setting forth the materiality thereof
to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief
that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records."
Id.
8
N.Y. Civ. RiOHTs LAW § 50(a) (West 1999). Section 50 codified the case law
in this area and provides in pertinent part that:
(1) Personnel records of the police and fire departments are not subject to inspection without the written consent of the officer except as
mandated by a court order. (2) Prior to the issuance of such an order,
the judge must review the request to determine if there is sufficient
factual basis to warrant the production of the file for review by the
court. (3) If after such a hearing, the judge finds sufficient basis, the
sealed file will be sent to the judge for review to determine whether
the records are relevant and material to the action. Upon such a
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privilege is intended to balance the constitutional rights of the accused
with the interests of law enforcement agencies.8 6 In order for a defendant
to breach the confidentiality of internal affairs records, the defendant
87
must first make a clear factual showing that disclosure is warranted.
This requirement is to insure the defendant's request is not "merely a
desperate grasping at a straw., 8 8 If this threshold requirement is met, the
court will then perform an in camera review of the files to determine if
the disclosure of relevant and material information is to be allowed.8 9
Through this threshold requirement, New York's exemption works to
balance the state's interest in maintaining confidentiality with the interests of the defense. 90
Should Massachusetts enact an exemption for police personnel I
internal affairs files, the procedural guidelines for disclosure would be
shaped by recent case law.9 1 In Commonwealth v. Bishop,92 the Massafinding the court shall make relevant and material portions of the record available to the requesting parties.

Id.
See People v. Gissendanner, 48 N.Y.2d 543, 548 (1979) (illustrating interests
balanced by New York statute). In its holding, the court recognized:
the tension between the constitutionally based rights of an accused to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses on the one hand, and
the interest of the state and its agents in maintaining confidential date
relating to performance and discipline of police on the other. Among
other values the latter is said to serve are the maintenance of police
morale and the encouragement of both citizens and officers to cooperate fully without fear of reprisal or disclosure in internal investigations into misconduct.

Id. at 547- 48.
87

See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50(a)(2) (defining standard for threshold inquiry

of internal police files).
Gissendanner,48 N.Y.2d at 550.
See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50(a)(3) (describing proper use of in camera review to determine disclosure); People v. Shakur, 648 N.Y.S.2d 200, 205 (1996) (synthesizing New York process of disclosure). In Shakur, defendants requested to review the
personal files of "any law enforcement agent who participated in the investigation" of
charges of sexual assault. Id. The court characterized defendants' request as "boilerplate" and without merit as no reason was given to believe the requested police files
contained information helpful to the defense. Id.
" See Shakur, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 205 (demonstrating need to meet threshold requirement).
9' See infra notes 92-106 (describing procedural guidelines for disclosure).
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chusetts court followed the attitude of the New York courts that defendants should not be allowed to embark on random fishing expeditions in
their examination of privileged sexual assault records.93 Bishop set out a
five-step process by which a defendant may request the discovery of a
sexual assault victim's confidential information. 94 First, the judge deter95
mines whether the requested information is protected by privilege.
Second, if the documents fall under a privilege, the moving party's request must indicate that the materials are relevant to an issue in the case,
and if so, the judge will conduct an in camera review to limit the documents to those which are relevant. 96 Third, the judge allows both the
prosecutor and defense counsel to review relevant documents to determine whether disclosure is necessary for the defense. 97 If this burden is
met, the judge will permit the disclosure of those portions of the records
necessary for the preparation and assertion of the defense. 98 The final
at trial as to the admisstage of this process is the judge's determination
99
sibility of the documents in question.
The 1996 case of Commonwealth v. Fullerl°° expanded the application of the Bishop test while clarifying its standards. 1 ' 1 First, the
Fullercourt held that the Bishop standard and protocol should be applied
to the disclosure of any privileged records. 1 2 The court then stated that
the Bishop "likely to be relevant" standard for in camera inspection was
416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d 990 (1993).
See id. at 182, 617 N.E.2d at 997 (quoting language of Gissendanner decision
in defining parameters of defendant access).
See id. at 181-84 (outlining five-step discovery procedure).
See id. at 181(illustrating first step of Bishop test).
9

See id. at 182 (utilizing in camera review to determine validity of relevancy

claim).
97

See Bishop, 416 Mass. at 182 (describing prosecution and defense review of

documents).
98

See id. at 183 (illustrating minimal disclosure).

" See id. (illustrating judge's role of determining admissibility). See also Adrienne Kotoski, Note, How Confidential is this ConversationAnyway?: Discoverabilityof
Exculpatory Materials in Sexual Assault Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK JOURNAL OF TRIAL AND
APPELLATE ADVOCACY,

65, 81-83 (1998) (discussing five steps of Bishop test).

Mass. 216 (1996).
See infra notes 102 and 104 and accompanying text (broadening application and
tightening Bishop standard).
'02 See Fuller,423 Mass at 224 (expanding application of Bishop test). The court
stated that Commonwealth v. Rape Crisis Program of Worcester, Inc., 416 Mass. 1001
(1993) "plainly indicates that this court intended the Bishop standard and protocol to
apply when a defendant seeks access to any privileged records." Id.
'00 423
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too broad and would result in almost automatic production of privileged
records for review. 0 3 The court in Fuller raised the standard for in camera review by requiring a showing of "good faith, specific, and reasonable basis for believing that the records will contain exculpatory evidence which is relevant and material to the issue of the defendant's
guilt." 1' 4 The Fuller court intended this new standard to balance the interests of both sides while recognizing the authority of a statutory privilege. 0 5 This line of cases reveals a growing recognition within the Massachusetts judiciary of the need for confidentiality in order to promote a
public interest.' 6
VII. CONCLUSION
As issues of police misconduct gain more public attention, police
departments have become more conscious of the need to be proactive and
self-regulating. A statutory privilege to protect the confidentiality of an
internal affairs investigation would elevate the Wanis standard while
protecting a defendant's constitutional rights. By enacting a statutory
privilege for police personnel / internal affairs files, both police officers
and civilians may more readily break the Code of Silence and cooperate
with an internal investigation. By identifying potential problem officers,
a law enforcement agency may serve the public interest by taking appropriate action before an incident of gross police misconduct occurs.

John Joseph Powers, Jr.

See Fuller, 423 Mass. at 225 (holding standard too flexible).
'" See id.at 227 (defining new standard); Kotoski, supra note 99 at 88 (explaining
Fuller shift in Bishop standard).
06See Fuller, 423 Mass. at 226-27 (explaining balancing of interests in disclosure).
106 See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 176, 617 N.E.2d
990, 997 (1993)
(describing possible chilling effect of disclosure of sexual assault materials on victims).
'03

